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Reforming High-Stakes Police Departments:
How Federal Civil Rights Will Rebuild
Constitutional Policing in America
by IVANA DUKANOVIC*
Introduction
When eighteen-year-old Michel Brown was fatally shot by Officer
Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014, the small St. Louis
suburb erupted. Brown's shooting set off weeks of racially charged
protests and clashes between protestors and police, further exacerbated by
the controversial decision not to indict Officer Darren Wilson.
Subsequently, hopes for justice shifted to the federal investigations into the
shooting-one criminal and the other civil.
Even though the criminal case against Officer Wilson was quickly
closed,1 the broader civil rights investigation into the entire Ferguson
Police Department uncovered vast systematic and constitutional
deficiencies. Following 100 days of onsite investigation, countless ride-
alongs, and review of over 35,000 pages of police records, the Justice
Department found that the Ferguson Police Department stressed and
reinforced revenue generation and racial bias at the expense of lawful,
constitutional policing.2 The results of the civil investigation will lead to
significant changes within the department and set the tone for future state
and local police department overhauls.
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1. Evan Perez & Wes Bruer, Justice Department: No Darren Wilson Charges, CNN (Mar.
4, 2015, 8:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/04/politics/ferguson-darren-wilson-justice-
department-report/.
2. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
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The civil investigation was initiated under a little known statute: 42
U.S.C. § 14141. Under § 14141, the U.S. Attorney General has authority
to usher in structural reform litigation against local police departments.
Enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, the statute enables the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to sue a police
department when "a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers ... deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 3 In effect, the
statute serves as a civil mechanism for instituting constitutional policing
through the investigative and judicial processes.
A pattern-or-practice investigation under § 14141 is a civil, rather than
criminal, inquiry. It seeks to determine if there are systematic problems in
specific police departments and results in equitable or declaratory relief to
eliminate the pattern or practice.4 While ideal in theory, the statute lacks
effective, long-term enforcement due to three crucial and oftentimes
conflated missing ingredients: (1) aggressive enforcement, (2) political will
to intervene, 5 and (3) DOJ resources to fight pushback, reform-resisting
police departments. 6  Deficiencies aside, reforming departments plagued
with unconstitutional policing must take priority over punishing individual
officers.
Not all departments welcome structural reform. These departments,
also known as pushback departments, challenge the constitutionality of all-
encompassing DOJ oversight and the evidence needed to prove an
"unconstitutional pattern or practice." 7  While the Supreme Court has
previously expressed the importance of local control in law enforcement
matters,8 times have changed. The inception and proliferation of § 14141
has enabled what some call a federal strong-arming of the classic and
3. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006)).
4. Id.
5. Under former Attorney General Eric Holder, prosecutors opened more than twenty pattern-
or-practice investigations nationwide-more than under any other serving Attorney General. See
Simone Weichselbaum, Policing the Police, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 26, 2015, 6:12 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/23/policing-the-policc#.TtDL7eWDz.
6. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489,
516-19 (2008).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 28 F. Supp. 3d 499 (M.D.N.C. June 20, 2014)
(challenging the § 14141 civil suit brought against the Alamanee County Sheriff's Office and
moving for summary judgment).
8. Expressing the Supreme Court's solicitude and concern for the importance of local
control in law enforcement matters, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1981); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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traditional local police power. Yet, successful reforms in Los Angeles and
Seattle demonstrate otherwise. Welcome or not, effective federal reform
requires reform-minded local leadership, front-line officer buy-in, and
long-term strategies for accountability and sustainability that benefit both
officers and community members.
This Note uses the Ferguson Police Department as a § 14141 case
study and provides suggestions and predictions for sustainable law
enforcement reform. The Note proposes that § 14141 is the change agent
for organizations that refuse or deny a need for change. Part I explains
what tools the DOJ possesses for initiating structural police reform within
the bounds of the Constitution. Relying on past § 14141 investigations and
actions, Part II profiles the types of organizations likely to adopt change as
well as those that will insist on pushback. Given that post-reform
sustainability is one of the largest obstacles in § 14141 reform, Part III then
proposes backup plans for the DOJ if federal intervention falters ten years
after reform is initiated. Part IV predicts successes and potential pitfalls of
§ 14141 reform in Ferguson and discusses why Ferguson has potential to
set an example for incremental restructuring of high-profile, problematic
police departments. Lastly, Part V presents constitutional objections to
strong use of § 14141, rooted in case law that no longer exhibits the
realities and appropriate remedies required of twenty-first century policing
in America.
Overall, the goal of this Note is to highlight that police reform is most
effective when it involves simple adherence to rules and selective use of §
14141. This allows for incremental acceptance of organizational change.
Furthermore, federal reform draws global attention to systemic issues
infiltrating and festering in police departments and encourages other
jurisdictions to preemptively make improvements so as not to face federal
investigation. Ultimately, changing high-stakes, unconstitutional law
enforcement agencies starts with a provision buried in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Section 14141 provides just
enough push without severe finger pointing and blame shifting-giving
both sides reason to reform.
I. Police Misconduct: What the DOJ Can Really Do?
Historically, the DOJ is one of the few federal entities with oversight
over local and state police departments. Federal intervention, however, can
produce hostility in some police departments and suggested changes are
often politically unpopular. Currently, the DOJ Civil Rights Division has
major political reinforcement. During the Obama administration,
congressional funding for the division increased twenty-six percent-
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totaling $144.2 million at the end of 2014.9 But these funds whittle away
quickly considering the division works to uphold the civil and
constitutional rights of all Americans that are discriminated against. ' 0
Although the vast majority of law enforcement officers in this country
perform their difficult jobs in accordance with the law, there have been
blatant incidents where this is not the case. In such incidents, the DOJ
Civil Rights Division can demand change and address police misconduct
through a number of criminal or statutory paths," some more productive
than others.
A. The DOJ's Criminal Versus Civil Tool Box
If police misconduct rises to the level of a criminal offense, the DOJ
often utilizes two statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Under these federal
criminal statutes, it is a crime for one or more persons acting "under color
of law"'12 to willfully deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any
right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
3
However, criminal charges against individual officers under either of these
statutes are difficult to obtain and rarely successful. 4  This is often
attributed to certain realities of police prosecution: Jurors are usually more
sympathetic to police officers than criminal defendants, police are
9. Lisa M. Notler & Daniel Werly, DOJ Is Facing Tough Task in Ferguson Probe, NAT'L
L.J. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202673640437/DOJ-ls-Facing-
Tough-Task-in-Ferguson-Probc?slrctum=20150121150010.
10. About the Division, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (noting the division allocates funds
to tackle discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, familial status, and national
origin).
I. Private civil litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the most common cause of action
involving police misconduct but is brought by private citizens-not the DOJ. See 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2016) ("Every person who, under color of [the law] subjects ... any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured."). In terms of reform, a successful § 1983 suit is a
drop in the bucket. See Alexandra Holmes, Bridging the Information Gap: The Department of
Justice 's "Pattern or Practice" Suits and Community Organizations, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1241,
1245-46 (2014).
12. "Color of law" implies a misuse of power made possible because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of the state. Color of law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
In other words, it means the individual is using power granted to him through local, state, or
federal agencies, as is the case with police departments.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2016) (making it a federal crime for a police officer to violate a
person's constitutional or civil rights and implementing hefty criminal penalties for such
deprivation); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2016) (making conspiracy against individuals' constitutional or
legal rights illegal). Unlike most conspiracy statutes, § 241 does not require that one of the
conspirators commit an overt act prior to the conspiracy becoming a crime.
14. Holmes, supra note 11, at 1247.
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unwilling to testify against fellow officers, 15 and prosecutors are hesitant to
bring charges against officers with whom they may work with on a regular
basis.
16
Under §§ 241 and 242, prosecutors can shift the blame of an entire
agency onto one or two bad eggs within a department and avoid top-down
substantive organizational reform.17  This creates a sledgehammer impact.
That is, by singling out and heavily punishing a single bad officer or small
group of officers, the government does not fulfill one of the ultimate goals
of punishment within the criminal system: deterrence. There is no concrete
connection between the punishment of one officer and his bad acts
compared to the unconstitutional practices of an entire police department.
Though powerful against the individual officer, criminal punishment of
officers only serves the undesirable goal of finger pointing and blame
shifting, rather than remedying department-wide misconduct. Therefore,
even if the DOJ is able to successfully bring and win such a suit, there is no
guarantee that it will deter future conduct department wide.
In comparison, civil cases involving official misconduct are usually
brought against the police department as a whole. For instance, the DOJ
can implement police reform and incentivize departments to change by way
of leveraging federal funding. Together, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d"t and 42
U.S.C. § 3789d 19 prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, sex, and religion by state and local law enforcement
agencies that receive financial assistance from the DOJ. 20 These civil
rights statutes can be effective, considering that most communities,
including Ferguson, are served by a police force that receives federal funds.
15. See Myriam Gilles, Keeping Quiet, Covering Up and Never, Ever Ratting: The Effects
of the Code of Silence on Reforming Police Culture, 2003 WL 22002097, 1 (2003).
16. Id.; see also Holmes, supra note 11, at 1246-47.
17. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL
POLICE: LESSONS LEARNED 2, 16 (2013) ("Research has long suggested that a small percentage
of police officers account of a high percentage of use-of-force incidents.").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2016) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (2016) (providing, similar to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, a prohibition
against discrimination within federally-funded agencies and departments).
20. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced
by the Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/polmis.php. The official
misconduct that often triggers § 2000d and 3789d includes: harassment by way of racial slurs,
unjustified arrests, discriminatory traffic stops, use of excessive force, or refusal by an agency to
respond to complaints alleging discriminatory treatment by its officers.
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Under these civil laws, the DOJ may seek changes in department
policies and procedures, as well as individual restitution for victims. The
problem, however, is that these statutes do not necessarily demonstrate that
a department's activity was unconstitutional. For this reason, these claims
are often brought in conjunction with § 14141 complaints to ensure on-the-
ground investigation and surveillance of police departments engaging in
unconstitutional practices. This means that absent § 14141, it is difficult
for the government to assess real-time departmental violations. Therefore,
while the DOJ's criminal options for police misconduct are somewhat
heavy-handed, the civil sanctions hardly permeate the surface of
unconstitutional policing.
B. The Real Fix: Restructuring Police Departments with 42 U.S.C. §
14141
Instead of sledgehammering into one bad officer or gently land
leveling an entire police department, a thorough remodeling is needed for
departments that promote unconstitutional practices and procedures. The
answer-§ 14141-came as a result of the egregious Rodney King incident
in 1994, after which Congress granted the DOJ the power to open multiyear
audits of police departments accused of unconstitutional practices and civil
rights violations.21 Section 14141 makes it unlawful for "any governmental
authority ... to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law
enforcement officers or by officials . . . that deprives persons of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States., 22 The statute, therefore, makes it unlawful for police
officers, state or local, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that
deprives any person of a constitutional right.
In effect, the statute authorizes the Attorney General to conduct
investigations and initiate civil litigation when there is reasonable cause to
believe a problematic pattern or practice exists within a police department.
The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the DOJ's Civil
Rights Division, specifically the Special Litigation Section ("SLS").23
Among other things, the SLS is responsible for enforcing § 14141
investigations and litigation.24
21. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2016).
22. Id.
23. About the Division, DEP'T OF JUSTICE: SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
24. Id.
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SLS receives thousands of complaints and referrals regarding alleged
police misconduct every year.25 It reviews all allegations of misconduct
and determines first whether the allegation establishes a violation of federal
law, and then, whether that conduct constitutes a pattern or practice under §
2614141. 6 Section 14141 focuses on violations of citizens' civil rights,
including excessive force, unlawful stops, and racially discriminatory
harassment.2 ' The behavior must constitute a "pattern or practice" in order
to implicate the law. That is, it must consist of more than one isolated
incident and the DOJ must be able to prove before a federal court that the
"incidents constituted a pattern of unlawful conduct. '28 To trigger federal
reform, the DOJ must establish that "racial discrimination was the []
standard operating procedure" 29 in the department.
Unlike monetary relief for victims, 30 the relief in a § 14141 civil
action is injunctive and usually includes a court order listing required
police department changes. Aside from providing a blueprint for proper,
constitutional policing, § 14141 also serves as a deterrent because the
effects are pricy. 31  These investigations and lawsuits are expensive for
both the DOJ and the targeted police department. 32  The mere threat of
federal intervention raises the expected costs of misconduct and motivates
proactive reform in departments not yet under investigation.
33
1. The Pattern-or-Practice Investigative Process
Section 14141 civil litigation progresses in six stages: (1) case
selection, (2) preliminary inquiry, (3) formal investigation, (4) settlement
25. Holly James McMickle, Letting DOJ Lead the Way: Why DOJ's Pattern or Practice
Authority Is the Most Effective Tool to Control Racial Profiling, 13 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 311, 324 (2010). The allegations, and underlying information, are produced by everyday
individuals, organizations, advocacy groups, attorneys, police officers, judges, journalists, and
even from the police departments or jurisdictions themselves.
26. Id. at 323-34.
27. Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, supra note 20.
28. See Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (setting a high
bar for the pattern or practice requirement in the context of Title VII suits); see also Laws
Enforced by the DOJ, supra note 20 ("The DOJ must be able to show in court that the agency has
an unlawful policy or that the incidents constituted a pattern of unlawful conduct. However,
unlike the other civil laws discussed below, DOJ does not have to show that discrimination has
occurred in order to prove a pattern or practice of misconduct.").
29. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
30. See supra Part 1.B (discussing DOJ avenues for obtaining monetary relief for civil rights
victims).
31. Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 33,44 (2012).
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 44-45.
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negotiations, (5) appointment of monitor, and (6) monitored reform. 34
Professor Stephen Rushin, an expert in police reform, continues to make
strides in the scholarship and literature pertaining to structural police
reform under § 14141. In a recent article, he builds a thorough description
of how the structural police reform process under § 14141 unfolds.35 This
Subpart introduces the general steppingstones of a standard pattern-or-
practice investigation to provide context for the Note's thesis and analysis
of Ferguson's reform.
There are 20,000 police and sheriff departments in the nation. 36 This
begs the question: how does the DOJ decide which of the 20,000
departments is ripe for case selection under § 14141? Applying empirical
methods, such as in-depth and anonymous interviews with major
community stakeholders 37 in the reform process, Rushin uncovered five
primary considerations that the DOJ relies on for § 14141 case selection:
(1) existing civil litigation or private interest group investigations, (2)
major media reports, (3) research studies, (4) whistleblowers within police
departments, and (5) particularly egregious individual incidents of
misconduct.
38
The DOJ then examines public sources to conduct a private and
confidential preliminary inquiry into practices and procedures.39 At this
point in the process, the DOJ is very particular in pointing out that it is
conducting an "inquiry," not an investigation. This is because mislabeling
the situation as an "investigation" prematurely opens up the department to
media criticism.
If this initial inquiry uncovers the possibility of persistent police
misconduct in a department, the DOJ moves on to the meat of the matter-
a formal investigation. These formal investigations are expensive, time-
consuming, and subject to public knowledge and scrutiny.40 During formal
investigation, the DOJ takes inventory of departmental policies and
34. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1367 (2015).
35. See generally id. (detailing the step-by-step process involved in § 14141 reform from
beginning to end).
36. Data Collection: Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=249 (last visited Mar. 22,
2016).
37. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1365. "These stakeholders fall into three different categories:
DOJ litigators, external monitors, and police officials." Id.
38. Id. at 1369 (noting the fifth option occurs only in rare circumstances).
39. See Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3189, 3247 (2014) (explaining how DOJ civil rights lawyers review available data, examine news
reports, and interview community members during the preliminary inquiry stage).
40. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1370.
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procedures, from training and discipline to reported and unreported uses of
excessive force.4 1 It also sifts through community complaints and conducts
interviews with citizens, police chiefs, and frontline officers within the
42department. DOJ attorneys do not conduct investigations on their own;
they outsource work to police experts, who partake in ride-alongs, review
police policy manuals, and observe police training.
43
As of 2015, the DOJ has initiated sixty-seven formal investigations,
averaging about three investigations per year since 1997." If the formal
investigation reveals a pattern or practice of abusive, unconstitutional
conduct, the DOJ releases a letter to announce its findings publicly.45 From
there, technically, the DOJ can bring a civil lawsuit against the police
46department and eventually bring the claim to court. In practice, however,
the DOJ almost always settles with departments in violation of § 14141.7
2. Settlement and Enforcement: What Is a Consent Decree and Why Does It
Work?
When a pattern or practice is established, the DOJ has options for
legally enforcing organizational and systematic reform of those
unconstitutional patterns or practices. First, the DOJ may file a lawsuit
against the police agency, which will likely result in lengthy litigation. The
second, and more frequently applied option, is to file a lawsuit with the
expectation that it will settle, either with a consent decree or a
memorandum of agreement ("MOA").4 8  Although both consent decrees
and MOAs are forms of settlement negotiations between the DOJ and the
local police agency, a consent decree is referred to as an "MOA with
teeth.
49
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1371. Nine remain unresolved. Kimbriell Kelly et al., Forced Reforms, MixedResults,
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/1/13/forced-
reforms-mixed-results/.
45. See, e.g., Detroit Department Use of Force Findings Letter, DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 6,
2002), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dpd/detroit_3_6.php.
46. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1372.
47. Id. at 1377 (citing twenty-four settled negotiations in twenty-two jurisdictions since §
14141's inception).
48. DARRELL L. Ross, CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 186 (Elisabeth Roszmann
Ebben ed., 6th ed. 2014).
49. Id.
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Consent decrees are formal court-ordered and court-enforceable
settlements, and usually provide for about five years of judicial oversight.5°
In contrast, MOAs are private contracts between the troubled municipality
and the government.51  While the municipality, alongside the police
department, agrees in writing to abide by DOJ recommendations for reform
and restructuring, there is no judicial oversight to check on departmental
compliance with reform. 52 A consent decree is the better route for long-
term enforcement of high-profile police agencies, whose activities have
sparked nationwide skepticism regarding how police treat citizens. The
decrees, effectively, allow the federal government, states, and localities to
agree on proactive systems of preventing future misconduct and civil rights
violations-all with a judge's gavel looming large. Either way, both
consent decrees and MOAs call for independent monitors, who report on
the police department's compliance within the respective agreement.53
After a consent decree or MOA is imposed, a special monitor is
appointed to serve as an independent auditor of the police department.
"The monitor typically involves a team of professional consultants with
prior law enforcement management experience, involvement in pattern or
practice litigation, or involvement in overseeing management reforms in
other areas of business or professional life. 54 The team submits quarterly
public reports on the department's compliance with DOJ reform. When the
monitor reports that the department has successfully met the terms of the
decree, or MOA, the team is terminated and the district court accepts the
team's judgment.55
The New Orleans consent decree is the most comprehensive
agreement the DOJ has reached with a police department to date.56 The
154-page court order is the product of § 14141 formal investigation of the
New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD"), whose alleged post-Hurricane
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedyfor Police Misconduct:
A Model State "Pattern or Practice " Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 479, 511 (2009).
55. Id. at 511-12.
56. See Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Dept. at 2, United States v. City
of New Orleans, 35 F. Supp. 3d 788 (2013) (No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW), [hereinafter New
Orleans Consent Decree], http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/nopd-consentdccree
_7-24-12.pdf. The formal investigation revealed a pattern or practice of excessive force, illegal
stops, searches, and arrests, as well as racial, ethnic and transgender discrimination.
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Katrina police violence stirred national attention.57 The precedential factor
was the level of transparency incorporated into the consent decree and
58
monitor selection process.
Under the consent decree, the NOPD was ordered to implement broad
changes in policies and practices related to a laundry list of unconstitutional
activities: use of force, illegal stops, searches and arrests, custodial
interrogations, photographic line-ups, discriminatory policing, community
engagement, recruitment, training, officer assistance and support,
performance evaluations and promotions, supervision, misconduct
investigations. 59  The decree focused heavily on a community-oriented
policing approach and engagement with neighborhood organizations and
groups. Most significantly, the consent decree mandated a complete
overhaul of the NOPD's standards regarding use of force. Under the
consent decree, the NOPD would now be required to regulate nearly every
possible outlet for use of force, ranging from oleoresin capsicum spray and
canines to firearms and tasers.
60
Such an agreement requires close and interactive oversight by a court-
appointed monitoring team. The New Orleans consent decree remains in
effect until the city demonstrates compliance with its provisions, or until
the monitor's assessment of the agreement's outcome demonstrates
sustained and continuing improvement in constitutional policing.
Monitoring and reform consistent with consent decrees can take as little as
five years to over a decade, depending on the agreement and department.
The DOJ does not expect complete, 100% compliance with the agreement,
but rather "substantial compliance. ' '61 This threshold is met if the monitor,
who goes through the terms paragraph-by-paragraph, determines a
department has satisfied ninety-four percent of the agreement as a whole. 62
A consent decree, especially one with detailed and specific police
culture modifications like the one created for the NOPD, provides a
57. Justice Department Announces Consent Decree with City of New Orleans to Resolve
Allegations of Unlawful Misconduct by New Orleans Police Department, DEP'T OF JUSTICE:
JUSTICE NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-
consent-decree-city-new-orleans-resolve-allcgations-unlawful.
58. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1388.
59. See New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 56, at 1.
60. Id. at 14-33.
61. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1394 n.279 (citing telephone interview with anonymous
external monitor, who stated that his team used a ninety-four percent completion rate to measure
compliance because "many of these elements require examination of documents [and t]o do that,
we really need to do scientific sampling... so, what were looking at was this sort of plus or
minus 5% error range around that level").
62. See id.
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blueprint for constitutional policing. Under these federally designated
metrics and often under the demanding, watchful eye of the monitor and a
federal judge, consent decrees can lead to significant compliance.
Furthermore, the recommendations for reform, outlined in these consent
decrees and MOAs, remain largely consistent. 63 Ultimately, all settlements
under § 14141 demand monitoring, reporting, and additional oversight by
the DOJ.
II. Issue Organizations and § 14141 Reform
Consent decrees are designed to force and incentivize change in even
the most fiercely resistant police departments, or "issue organizations,"
whether that resistance stems from the brass in charge of police
management or the rank-and-file officers on dispatch patrols. In fact, the
incentive to enter into a consent decree is so strong that the DOJ has only
resorted to filing civil complaints in ten instances since Congress enacted §
14141. 64  Oftentimes even the initiation of litigation will result in
settlement, because, as one former monitor and DOJ official said, "no city
has wanted to risk litigation., 65  While settlement appeases all those
involved temporarily, it does not destroy the prevalence of issue
organizations-police departments that either pushback against federal
intervention or falter in sustaining reform following the monitoring period.
While there is no formulaic definition of what encompasses an issue
organization, these organizations are an interesting breed of law
enforcement that epitomize resisting or relapsing departments. Drawing
from stubborn or struggling departments under § 14141 investigations, this
Part highlights persistent trends that appear in pushback or problematic
organizations, focusing on two local law enforcement agencies in
particular.
A. Refusal and Resistance: Alamance County
Lawsuits under § 14141 are infrequent because claims for injunctive
relief are more expensive and burdensome than settlement. One resisting
issue organization, however, broke the courtroom barrier this year. The
DOJ's investigation into the Alamance County Sheriffs Office ("ACSO")
63. Id. at 1378-87 (outlining the most prominent points of reform incorporated in
settlement agreements: (1) use of force, (2) early intervention and risk management systems, (3)
complaint procedures, (4) training overhaul, (5) bias-free policing, (6) community and problem-
oriented policing).
64. Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#police (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
65. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1375.
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marks the first time a § 14141 investigation resulted in trial-and the DOJ
lost.66 After a two-year investigation into the ACSO, the DOJ released a
formal findings letter,67 detailing ACSO's discriminatory policing practices
against Latinos and invited the ACSO to negotiate a court-enforceable
agreement to remedy the violations.68 Sheriff Terry Johnson refused to
enter into settlement negotiations, claiming the DOJ's allegations were
"meaningless" and that "no remedial measures are needed" within the
agency. 69 His resistance was met with further force.
On December 20, 2012, upon exhausting all reasonable attempts to
obtain ACSO compliance, the DOJ filed a civil rights lawsuit under §
14141 against the sheriff and his office. 70 The complaint alleged that "[t]he
discriminatory conduct [] observed is deeply rooted in a culture that begins
with Sheriff Johnson and permeates the entire agency.",7' Among other
things, the DOJ alleged that Sheriff Johnson and his high-rank officers
explicitly instructed deputies to target Latinos in traffic stops and fostered a
culture of bias by using anti-Latino slurs.72
On August 7, 2015, a North Carolina federal judge dismissed the case
against Sheriff Johnson and his office.73 Focusing on the alleged statement
that Sheriff Johnson asked his deputies to go "bring me some Mexicans,"
the court found this was unsupported and lacked appropriate context. 74 The
court did, however, admonish "language, epithets and slurs used by some
ACSO officers., 75 While some may find this to be the quintessential "slap
on the wrist," it signifies a grander layer of § 14141 reform: the value of
66. Court Rules for Alamance County Sheriff Terry Johnson in DOJ Discrimination Case,
Fox 8 (Aug. 7, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://myfox8.com/2015/08/07/court-rules-for-alamance-county-
sheriff-terry-johnson-in-doj-discrimination-case/.
67. See Letter from Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division to Clyde B. Albright, Alamancc
County Attorney (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with author).
68. Id.
69. See Complaint at 5, United States v. Terry Johnson, 28 F. Supp. 3d 499 (M.D.N.C.
2007) (No. 1:12-CV-01349) [hereinafter Alamance County Complaint].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sarah Newell Williamson, U.S. District Court Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against
Alamance County Sheriff GREENSBORO: NEWS & RECORD (Aug. 7, 2015, 1:39 PM),
http://www.greensboro.com/news/u-s-distriet-court-judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-alamance-co
unty/articlec06ald4e-c214-5a9d-9fed-8776b28c00bd.html (citing the court's opinion and
quoting, "[a]ftcr careful consideration, the court concludes that the government has failed to
demonstrate that the ACSO has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional law
enforcement against Hispanics").
74. Id.
75. Id.
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departmental challenge of DOJ allegations of unconstitutional policing.
Federal police reform is a two-way street, and if police departments have
valid reason and resources for pushback, this should be welcomed. The
goal is to uncover valid constitutional violations and the series of events
involving ACSO serves as a reality check for the DOJ that not all pushback
is unwarranted.
Departments that resist or refuse federal intervention impede the
structural reform process, for better or for worse. They also serve as
examples of where federal power needs to be dialed back. Meanwhile,
other issue organizations-prone to relapse-keep the DOJ alert as to
where more federal power and post-monitoring attention is needed.
B. Relapse Post-Monitoring: Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police ("the Bureau") presents another
prototype issue organization. As the first agency in the nation to undergo
federal intervention and a consent decree under § 14141 in 1997,76 the
Bureau's significant experience provides insight into the capacity of lasting
reform. It also sheds light on how long and why a department is motivated
to comply with a consent decree after the federal monitor is no longer in
the picture. Initially, researchers were optimistic that local Pittsburgh
officials would be able to maintain reform once the DOJ withdrew
oversight.77 However, with a newfound political structure and resistance
from front-line officers, reform policies in Pittsburgh are backsliding.
7 8
Once monitoring ends so does DOJ involvement-a gold standard that
may need reworking for troubled police departments like the Bureau.
Indeed, Pittsburgh citizens expressed that once the federal monitor left, the
sense of obligation to continue detailed, responsible reporting fled the
Bureau as well.79 In June 2005, federal monitors determined the Bureau
substantially complied with the consent decree, terminating federal
oversight.8°  Today, Pittsburgh residents question the long-term
sustainability of reform, and claim that the Bureau "isn't as open to outside
76. Laura Maggi, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police was the First in Nation with Official Federal
Intervention, NOLA.COM: THE PICAYUNE TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011, 7:29 AM), http://www.nola.
com/crime/index.ssf/201 / 10/pittsburgh bureau of police wa.html.
77. ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH'S
EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE: VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 62 (2002).
78. See infra note 82.
79. See ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING
IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?: THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE: VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE 37-39 (2005).
80. Id. at 41.
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scrutiny as it was a few years ago." 81 This sentiment stems from the city's
recent increase in police brutality incidents.
The reemergence of a police-community rift in Pittsburgh can be
attributed to the shift away from reform-minded local leadership. In 2006,
Pittsburgh citizens elected a new mayor, Robert O'Connor, to replace
Thomas Murphy, who supported reformed-minded Police Chief Robert
McNeilly." The new mayor immediately fired Police Chief McNeilly,
explaining his administration was looking to take a "different direction.,
84
The action arguably reversed over a decade of work McNeilly conducted
while vigorously enforcing the Pittsburgh consent decree.85 Pittsburgh's
current mayor, Bill Peduto, recently acknowledged that the Bureau has
experienced turmoil but is optimistic that a new command staff and "a rank
and file that understands promotion is no longer based on politics but
merit," will revitalize reform.8 6  The city's newest Police Chief Cameron
McLay also provides hope for revamping reform. "We're looking to polish
off what worked really well during the consent decree era," he said in
87March 2015. In doing so, Chief McLay will need internal recognition and
buy-in from rank-and-file officers before any emergence of police-
community trust can be reestablished.
The marked digression in Pittsburgh can also be attributed to a belief
that many frontline officers share: "de-policing." 88 The theory underlying
81. Maggi, supra note 76.
82. See Rich Lord & Liz Navratil, Jordan Miles Jury Reaches Split Verdict: Awards
Damages but Finds Against Excessive Force Claim, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2014
12:35 PM), http://www.post-gazette.comilocal/city/2014/03/31/Jury-reaches-verdict-in-Jordan-
Miles-civil-trial/stories/201403310142. (discussing one particularly brutal incident, amongst
several, that have reignited police-community tension in Pittsburgh); see also Robert Zullo,
Pittsburgh Police Create Standards Office to Increase Accountability, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2015/03/04/To-
increasc-accountability-Pittsburgh-police-create-standards-office/stories/201503040135.
83. Dennis B. Roddy, On His First Day as Mayor, O'Connor Greets Hundreds of Well-
Wishers, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 4, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/local/city/2006/01/04/on-his-first-day-as-mayor-o-connor-greets-hundreds-of-well-
wishers/200601040123.
84. Michael A. Fuoco, The Mayoral Transition: Police Chief Out, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Dec. 29, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2005/12/29/The-
mayoral-transition-Police-chief-out/stories/200512290284.
85. Michael A. Fuoco, Police Chief McNeilly's Tenure Saw Wrenching Changes, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 9, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2006/01/09/Police-
chief-McNeilly-s-tenurc-saw-wrcnching-changes/stories/200601090107.
86. Zullo, supra note 82.
87. id
88. See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding "Depolicing": Symbiosis Theory and
Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355 (2002) (defining de-policing and its connection
to cultural and identity theories).
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this behavioral concept is that federal intervention decreases police
efficiency and aggressiveness, which in turn increases crime. 89  One
Pittsburgh police officer said, "I think the decree limited officers' ability to
perform their jobs. And criminals know this and take advantage." 90
Officers in Pittsburgh believe, and perhaps rightfully so, that the consent
decree has jeopardized their legitimacy.
In 2005, the Vera Institute of Justice conducted a study regarding the
effectiveness of Pittsburgh's consent decree.91 The researchers found that
one year after most of the consent decree had been lifted, reform remained
firmly in place, but noted there was discontent among frontline officers.
92
Many officers surveyed following the consent decree revealed that they
experienced "low morale" and felt excluded from the reform process.
93
Officers also mentioned fear to engage in certain behavior for lack of
understanding negative employment consequences. These results
exemplify the need to include and discuss all of the terms of a city's
consent decree with rank-and-file officers prior to implementation. Change
not only requires officer buy-in, but also that every officer possesses some
minimal understanding of the consent decree's meaning, short and long-
term effects, and need for unified support for reform.
As the first consent decree, Pittsburgh's agreement laid the
groundwork for future negotiated settlements under § 14141. Yet, the
city's current situation proves that boilerplate consent decrees and
monitoring cannot be the "case closed" moment in structural police reform.
I. Sustaining Federal Reform with Follow-Up and Auditing
Procedures
One significant limitation on federal intervention under § 14141 is
sustainability of police reform following monitoring.94 Even the DOJ
admits it has "not studied the long-term outcomes at the law enforcement
agencies it has targeted. ' 95 The truth is some previously investigated police
departments need revisiting, whether due to insufficient training consistent
with settlements or a shift away from reform-minded leadership. This Part
proposes two solutions for institutionalizing reform after the monitor
89. Id.
90. Policing on Trial: Community, Race, Protest, and Reform (Mar. 19, 2015), UC Hastings
(where Stephen Rushin presented his recent analysis of § 14141 reform).
91. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 79.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1408.
95. Kelly et al., supra note 44.
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leaves: (1) follow-up procedures, and (2) internal, rather than solely
external, monitoring.
The monitoring team exits the reforming department once substantial
compliance is met. However, this benchmark is not a guarantee that
departments will sustain the terms of a consent decree forever. The
contract, whether court-enforceable or not, is a blueprint for reform-not a
template that once terminated is self-sustaining. The DOJ's legal approach
is centered on a timeframe of settlement completion. The goal is to reach a
level of reform that will suffice to terminate external oversight. The
problem with this approach is that sustainability of reform requires upkeep.
Discussing the results of his qualitative research, Rushin mentioned that the
one prominent request DOJ officials had when asked how § 14141 reform
could be improved was the institution of follow-up teams.96 These teams
would return to departments that underwent federal intervention to ensure
reform is maintained by local leaders and front-line officers. Branching off
this follow-up request, this Note advocates for a supplemental backup plan,
or follow-up process, in § 14141 interventions involving departments that
resemble issue organizations. Under this plan, departments that show signs
of refusal or relapse should be required to either incorporate a follow-up
procedure as part of the consent decree or employ a permanent internal
monitor as inside counsel once the consent decree is lifted.
A. Follow-up Clauses in a Consent Decree or MOA
Implementation of reform moves at a varying pace from department to
department, from five years in Cincinnati to twelve in Los Angeles. 97 This
is due in large part to organizational pathology, which trickles down from
leaders' resistance or lack of resources to change. 98 By identifying issue
organizations, the DOJ can require-by court-enforceable or contractual
agreements-that those organizations take additional follow-up
precautions. The DOJ often sets aggressive long-term deadlines, by which
agencies are required to meet substantial compliance.99 These deadlines
reflect the DOJ's opinion of the depth of organizational dysfunction and
capacity to implement mandated reforms."°° The focus, at least with issue
organizations, should be not only timelines for ultimate termination of
96. Telephone interview with Stephen Rushin, Law Professor, University of Alabama (Feb.
2,2015).
97. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1392.
98. Joshua Chanin, On the Implementation of Pattern or Practice Police Reform, 15
CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L & Soc'Y 38, 45 (2014).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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monitored reform, but also plans for revisiting departments that exhibit
high organizational dysfunction.
This Note proposes that depending on the size, scope, and level of
organizational dysfunction, a department that is projected to undergo about
ten years of reform efforts should be required to implement a follow-up
process. Such an adjustment would involve incorporating a single clause,
or section, into the consent decree that leaves room for federal oversight to
reappear in a department that is unable to maintain reforms absent an
external monitor following substantial compliance. The follow-up process
would only be required of issue organizations that experience trigger events
demonstrating that sustainability of reform will be more difficult than
expected. Trigger events could include an incessant streak of excessive
force incidents, severe decrease in data reporting and complaint resolutions,
or drastic shifts in department leadership. If any of these appear within the
reforming issue organization, the follow-up procedure should be instituted
to recalibrate and incentivize the police department to sustain reform on
their own.
Pittsburgh, first and foremost, would have benefited from a follow-up
clause in its consent decree with the DOJ 10 The legal literature and media
reports demonstrate that the Bureau experienced a few events indicating
that additional federal monitoring was needed. Given the absence of timely
and independent investigations into officer misconduct, extreme uses of
excessive force, and shuffling of police chiefs, the Bureau exemplifies need
for reform follow-up. 1°2 Monitored reform in Pittsburgh took about 8.2
years, 10 3 potentially because it was the first federal intervention of a local
police department or because it would be considered an issue organization
by today's standards. As Pittsburgh anticipates yet another consent decree,
this crisis could have been averted with an overly cautious consent decree.
Incorporating a follow-up procedure, baked into the consent decree, is
a simple, added precaution for the DOJ. Still, police departments may not
be receptive to follow-up teams. Detective Sergeant Brendan Kolding of
the Seattle Police Department said, "The door shouldn't be left open. The
local agency should be trusted to do its job once these matters are
101. Mid-reform, one Pittsburgh leader "suggested that 'the consent decree involve five
years of monitoring with another tcn-year probationary period during which the Police Bureau
would be required to submit written reports to the Department of Justice."' DAVIS ET AL., supra
note 77, at 47. While a step in the right direction, this Note proposes a probationary period for
only issue organizations, for which ten-plus years of reform is insufficient.
102. See discussion supra Part 11.B (discussing Pittsburgh's status as an issue organization in
need of backup reform).
103. See Rushin, supra note 34, at 1392 fig. 5.
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settled."1 4 A valid and strong criticism of federal follow-up is its potential
for unlimited encroachment on state and local police power. Reforming
departments, however, are already undergoing top-down investigations and
complete restructuring. An additional warning that federal intervention
may return could incentivize sustainability in issue organizations post-
intervention. Required follow-up procedures would increase police
accountability by reminding local departments that federal oversight could
return if substantial compliance is not maintained following federal
withdrawal.
B. Internal Monitor or Auditor for High-Stakes Issue Organizations
Continued oversight, or constant DOJ presence, is less common but
another valuable element of enforcing mandated reform post-intervention.
Departments that have internal structural deficiencies should be required to
incorporate internal auditing systems. The DOJ's goal should be to equip
issue organizations with in-house reform specialists-individuals who
make a living out of management and conflict resolution and also
understand potential legal ramifications. By recruiting retired, reform-
minded police leaders, experts, and attorneys, all of whom have worked
with the police, to serve as "auditors" or internal monitors, the DOJ can
improve the reform process and appease recalcitrant, front-line officers.
Selection of an external monitor is the most controversial point in
settlement negotiations.' 5  The main point of contention rests on the
monitor's level of law enforcement background. While police departments
push for monitors with law enforcement experience, the DOJ stresses a
need for lawyers. Indeed, front-line officer buy-in is more likely if officers
know their reform leader "has worn their shoes for a while."10 6 Then again,
every top-down intervention of a local police department involves
complicated matters of constitutional law and criminal procedure, for
which monitors with general legal background are useful, especially when
it comes to interfacing with the court and explaining legal implications of
reform. °7 Even so, police officials and local community stakeholders have
104. Telephone interview with Brendan Kolding, Detective Sergeant, Seattle Police
Department ("SPD") (Feb. 19, 2016). Kolding works in the Policy Unit of the SPD, where he has
been implementing § 14141 reform and writing new police policies pursuant to the consent
decree. The SPD does not classify as an issue organization. The department's reform efforts
have been recognized and praised all the way to the White House. Amy Clancy, Seattle Police
Department's Reform Efforts to Be Recognized by White House, KIRO7 (July 21, 2015, 5:38 PM),
http://www.kiro7.com/news/seattle-police-departments-reform-efforts-be-recog/28733573.
105. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1388.
106. Id. at 1390.
107. Id.
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commented that the reform process is too adversarial.'0 8 The complaints
center on claims that: lawyers are talking with other lawyers, the
agreements are too complex and lengthy, negotiations are time-consuming,
case monitors can become problematic, and police unions can serve to
undermine agreed-upon changes.'09
The solution is a neutral peacekeeper and auditor, who has both legal
and law enforcement experience and can take on a stable role inside the
department. For instance, a unique auditing system proved beneficial in
reforming the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") long-term.110
LAPD's consent decree required the creation of an Audit Division that sent
undercover informants to LAPD stations to monitor progress, specifically
in terms of reform of the department's complaint system."' To this day,
the Audit Division is responsible for tracking the implementation of
recommendations the department adopts and allows the department to
scrutinize and test its own internal controls over police activity.' 12 No other
police organization maintains as thorough and professional an internal audit
procedure."l
3
An extended and permanent monitoring or auditing process that
imitates LAPD's Audit Division would simultaneously bolster
accountability and appease law enforcement agencies with deeper-rooted
organizational dysfunction. During standard § 14141 reforms, the external
monitor regularly visits the police agency to audit departmental records and
meet with officers. Department visits and audits result in quarterly public
reports that evaluate the agency's progress in implementing the terms of the
settlement. An extended and internal approach would amplify these duties
108. TAKING STOCK: REPORT FROM THE 2010 ROUNDTABLE ON THE STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICE PATTERN OR PRACTICE PROGRAM 4 (42 USC § 14141) (2011).
109. Id.
110. CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., PROGRAM IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, POLICING Los ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT
DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 42 (2009).
111. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-1 1769-GAF-RC, at 23-27 (C.D. Cal. June
15, 2001) [hereinafter Los Angeles Consent Decree], http://www.clearinghouse.nct/chDocs
/public/PN-CA-0002-0006.pdf.
112. STONE ET AL., supra note 110, at 39 (evaluating LAPD's Audit Division and comparing
the management process to the "same way [a] large corporation conducts audits of its internal
financial controls").
113. Id. at 42. The internal auditing process remains a national leader and is credited for
LAPD's "remarkable and statistically significant improvement in its adherence to complaint
procedures." Rushin, supra note 34, at 1403 (stating that the LAPD's novel auditing system
helped the department achieve nearly perfect compliance with complaint procedures under the
consent decree, correcting a problem that plagued the department for years).
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and add a familiar face to the reform process in resistant or relapsing
organizations.
However, there is a concern that the employment of a permanent
monitor in police departments in need of additional federal oversight would
eventually lead to agency capture. Agency capture is a form of political
corruption whereby government agencies or entities established to regulate
a certain body, end up influenced and controlled by the very agencies they
were supposed to regulate." 4 In the context of police department reform,
agency capture would surface after a permanent monitor-brought in by
the federal government to regulate police misconduct-becomes so
embedded in the agency that he makes concessions or overlooks
misconduct. The fear is that the police department's brass and officers will
unduly influence the monitor, resulting in decisions that unfairly favor the
private interests of the regulated organization. Given that the organizations
likely to be assigned a permanent, internal monitor are issue organizations
that initially refused federal oversight, they may have even more incentive
to "capture" the internal monitor and rid themselves of federal oversight.
While the solution for possible agency capture may be as simple as
executing rotations of internal monitors, such an approach might also
defeat the very purpose of the extended monitoring process-instituting a
familiar, neutral face inside the department.
Regardless, weighing the potential for agency captures against the
increased chances of sustainability in the issue organizations, an in-house
monitor is a greater benefit than detriment. Additionally, these internal
checks would only occur in identified issue organizations undergoing
reform, not every department facing § 14141 intervention. This is because
high-stakes, issue organizations are more likely to fall prey to lengthy,
expensive litigation-or worse-relapse to pre-settlement police
misconduct. Optimizing reform with follow-up procedures or permanent
auditing will provide steps toward sustainable reform and serve as backup
where trouble is projected.
IV. Applying § 14141 Reform Within the Ferguson Police
Department
On September 4, 2014, then Attorney General Eric Holder launched a
§ 14141 inquiry into the Ferguson Police Department ("FPD")." 5 This
114. See, e.g., Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir. 1988) (defining
agency capture).
115. Delvin Barrett, Justice Department to Open Broad Inquiry Into Ferguson Police, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2014, 4:09 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justicc-department-to-open-broad-
inquiry-into-fcrguson-police- 1409791620.
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investigation revealed a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct within the
FPD and the municipal court system that violated the First, Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."n 6 This Part outlines the significant results of the
§ 14141 investigation in Ferguson and provides a prognosis for how reform
will unravel in the smallest department to undergo pattern-or-practice
reform. Aiming to profile the FPD, this Part also highlights factors that
may or may not facilitate sustainable reform in Ferguson. Most
importantly, this Part tailors the suggested backup plans-follow-up
procedures and internal monitors-to the FPD, should § 14141 reform not
yield results within ten years.
A. Results from the Formal Pattern-or-Practice Investigation in
Ferguson
On March 5, 2015, the DOJ released a report summary ("the Report")
on its findings in Ferguson following its pattern-or-practice
investigation. 117 The Report detailed (1) that Ferguson's law enforcement
practices focus on revenue generation rather than public safety, and (2) that
racial bias infiltrated the city's law enforcement and municipal court
system. 118
In terms of revenue generation, the DOJ uncovered that the city
"budgets for sizable increases in municipal fines and fees each year,
exhorts police and court staff to deliver those revenue increases, and
closely monitors whether those increases are achieved." 119  Officer
promotions depend on "productivity," in essence, the number of citations
issued. 20  As a result of the city and FPD's prioritization of revenue
generation, many officers see residents-especially those living in
Ferguson's predominantly African-American neighborhoods-not as
citizens in need of protection, but as sources of revenue. The data shows
that the city's emphasis on revenue has a significant effect on policing. In
addition, the FPD appears to bring certain minor offenses almost
exclusively against African-Americans. From 2011 to 2013, African-
116. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2.
117. Matt Apuzzo, Ferguson Police Routinely Violate Rights of Blacks, Justice Dept. Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimcs.com/2015/03/04/us/justice-department-finds-
pattem-of-police-bias-and-excessive-force-in-ferguson.html.
118. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (uncovering that in 2013 Ferguson's municipal
court issues over 9,000 arrest warrants on cases stemming in large part from minor infractions
such as traffic tickets and housing code violations). Of the $11.7 million Ferguson collected in
2010 in general fund revenue, $1.38 million originated from fines and fees collected by the court.
Id. at 9.
119. Id. at2.
120. Id.
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Americans made up ninety-five percent of "Manner of Walking in
Roadway" charges (i.e., jaywalking tickets) and ninety-four percent of
"Failure to Comply" charges (i.e., disobeying a lawful order or refusing to
identify oneself). 121
The Report indicates a pervasive problem relevant to revenue
generation and racial bias-the decision to arrest.122 FPD officers routinely
abuse the "Failure to Comply" charge; arresting individuals who refuse to
follow officers' orders, even where a request is unreasonable or
unconstitutional. 123 Refusal, however, is not a crime, and the First
Amendment protects talking back to a police officer.124 FPD officers also
consistently issue multiple citations during one stop; during at least one
instance an officer issued fourteen citations. 125  In fact, during formal
investigation officers told the DOJ that some compete to see who can issue
the most citations in a single encounter. 26 Each month a list is posted
inside the FPD police station, detailing the number of tickets each officer
issues-a tactic to incentivize more ticketing.
27
Despite these unflattering statistics, we need police discretion.
Without it, our communities become ridden with crime. However, it is
evident that some departments need better training regarding the proper use
of that valued discretion. The Report demonstrates FPD officers used
minor violations to take advantage and disproportionately target lower
income citizens.128  Citing data collected from 2012-2014, the DOJ
reported that-despite making up sixty-seven percent of the Ferguson
population-African-Americans accounted for eighty-five percent of traffic
stops, ninety percent of citations, ninety-three percent of arrests, and nearly
ninety percent of use-of-force incidents. 
129
121. Id. at4.
122. Id. at 81.
123. Id. at 19-20 (stating that Ferguson's stop-and-identify subsection of the "failure to
comply charge" is unconstitutionally vague). Ferguson's stop-and-identify law also stands in
tension with the Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 407-98 (1983), in
which the Court reasoned that a person approached by the police "need not answer any question
put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way."
124. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits
government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal
prosecutions, for speaking out."); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) ("[T]he First
Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police
officers.").
125. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Id. at 4.
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Potentially the most discussed DOJ findings were the various
derogatory emails exchanged between police department supervisors and
courthouse officials. The DOJ cited these emails as direct evidence of
racial bias by influential Ferguson decision makers.' 30 One email stated:
"An African-American woman in New Orleans was admitted into the
hospital for a pregnancy termination. Two weeks later she received a
check for $5000. She phoned the hospital to ask whom it was from. The
hospital said, "Crimestoppers. ' ' 13 Another email described a man seeking
to obtain "welfare" for his dogs because they are "mixed in color,
unemployed, lazy, can's speak English and have no frigging clue who their
Daddies are."' 32 The pattern-or-practice investigation determined that no
officer or court clerk engaging in these communications was ever
disciplined. The emails, instead, were forwarded along to others.
1 33
The extensive Report concluded with a list of twenty-six "broadly
identified changes necessary for meaningful and sustainable reform" in
both the FPD and Ferguson municipal court system.' 34 The DOJ sought
institutional changes, such as documenting stops, searches, ticketing, and
arrests to ensure the focus is no longer revenue but community protection.
Other suggested reforms include: mandated training, instituting policies for
dealing with vulnerable people, and reducing bias and its impact of police
behavior and discretion. 35 Based on the findings, the road to "meaningful
and sustainable reform" in Ferguson will be windy, bumpy, and far from
contained within the four comers of the Report and recommendations.
B. Predictions, Peaks, and Pitfalls in Ferguson's Structural Reform
Process
So far, the § 14141 reform in Ferguson has taken on a fairly
predictable progression, as its status as an issue organization rears its
resisting head. Since the Report was released, city and police leaders have
stepped down and media reports continue to publicly shame city officials
and FPD officers as the city prepares itself for what could be a decade-long
intervention.136 As of this writing, the City of Ferguson and the DOJ
130. Id. at 71.
131. Id. at 72.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 94.
136. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
released a 127-page draft consent decree ("the Decree"). 137  The Decree
focuses on "reorient[ing] Ferguson's use-of-force policies toward de-
escalation and avoiding force," and requires the implementation of
community boards to enhance relationships between FPD officers and
community members.' 38  As with most consent decrees, the agreement
requires the appointment and selection of an independent monitor and the
use of body-worn and in-car cameras. 
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On February 9, 2016, the Ferguson City Council approved the Decree,
but under the condition that the DOJ adopt seven revisions or
amendments-including to cap monitoring fees at $1 million over the first
five years and no more than $250,000 in a single year of reform. 140
Understandably, the city's chief concern is that the proposed reform could
financially break the city, which has a budget of about $14 million and is
$2.8 million in debt.'141  The proposed amendments follow estimations
made by Ferguson Mayor James Knowles III and other city officials that
the DOJ's requests could potentially cost the city $10 million over the next
three years.142 As many predicted, the DOJ was not open to renegotiating.
Instead, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced, one day after the
city council meeting, that the DOJ filed a civil rights lawsuit against
Ferguson.4 3  "The City of Ferguson had a real opportunity here to step
forward, and instead they've turned backwards," she said. "They've
chosen to live in the past."1'4
137. Eyder Peralta, Ferguson, Justice Unveil Draft of Negotiated Consent Decree, NPR (Jan.
27, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/27/464610005/ferguson-
justice-unvcil-draft-of-ncgotiated-consent-dccree. For the full draft of the most recent Decree, see
United States v. City of Ferguson, 4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter
Ferguson Draft Consent Decree], https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/83370 1/download.
138. Ferguson Draft Consent Decree, supra note 137.
139. Id. at 52, 103.
140. Ferguson's Proposed Amendments to the DOJ Consent Decree, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Feb. 10, 2016, 9:54 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-fcrguson-justice-department-plan-
20160210-story.html.
141. Aamer Madhani & Kevin Johnson, Justice Department Threatens Legal Action Against
Ferguson, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2016, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/
02/09/fcrgson-doj-consent-decrcc/80084794/.
142. Id.
143. Matt Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course on
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/1 1/us/politics/justice-
departmcnt-sues-ferguson-over-police-deal.html.
144. ld Ferguson finally accepted the DOJ's consent decree on March 15, 2016, after initially
refusing to do so. Laura Wagner, Ferguson City Council Accepts Consent Decree Worked Out with
Justice Department, NPR (Mar. 15, 2016, 9:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thctwo-way/2016/03/
15/470598733/ferguson-city-council-accepts-dcal-with-justice-department.
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Despite Ferguson's hesitations, the structural reform process has
worked well in several cities.1 45 But the prognosis for sustainable reform in
Ferguson remains open for discussion as Ferguson responds to the lawsuit,
the Decree is finalized, and the reform is instituted. This Subpart is
designed to present the peaks and pitfalls the pattern-or-practice reform
may present in Ferguson. With several advancements, from technology to
nationwide recognition of the Ferguson's unconstitutional policing, the
dispute in Ferguson may be groundbreaking. This § 14141 reform is the
most closely watched since the DOJ began such investigations in 1997, and
it will likely set the tone for more sustainable reform in other high-stakes
police departments.
1. Reassessing and Revising the Meaning of Police Discretion
The Report generally found that FPD officers relied heavily on minor
infractions to cite, arrest, and raise city revenue. Given the misuse of
minor violations and the instinctiveness to arrest lower income citizens, the
FPD lacks a proper understanding of when to wield appropriate discretion.
If not recalibrated, the inability to properly use discretion could affect
reform efforts in Ferguson. The answer, for now, is more supervision over
FPD officers, notifying them that records of who and why they choose to
arrest will be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
Arrests made for "Failure to Comply" with law enforcement present
the harshest example of FPD officers exploiting discretion in an
unconstitutional and racist manner.1 46  Several cases depicted individuals
who were arrested for refusing to identify themselves, even though it was
within their rights to do so.1 47 And, one man was arrested after he refused
to provide his social security number to a police officer who approached
him for no apparent reason.148
Before reform in Ferguson can take flight, the entire command staff
needs a reiteration of what constitutes a valid legal violation, warranting a
valid arrest. It is well established that front-line officers have significant
145. The SPD, which has already reached initial consent decree compliance, is projected to
terminate reform by 2018, amounting to about six years of federal reform. Telephone interview
with Brendan Kolding, Detective Sergeant, SPD (Feb. 19, 2016). However, as Kolding noted,
cities like Ferguson and New Orleans do not have the same resources as Seattle, and the level of
severity in offenses is not comparable.
146. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. In one case, an officer arrested two female
high school students because he saw them fighting after he told one to stay home and the other
not to seek her out.
147. Id. at 20-21. The Decree, as of now, as an entire section dedicated to reiterating First
Amendment protected activity. See Ferguson Draft Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 26-30.
148. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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discretionary authority. 49  These officers, with the guidance of their
supervisors, maintain the ultimate control over how new departmental
policies and procedures will be accomplished in the field. 150  An officer's
overbearing and unconstitutional use of discretion often leads to racial
disparities, exhibited by the high percentage of African-American arrests
for petty, vague offenses. Ferguson should take note of the organizational
deficiencies in issue organizations like Alamance County 5' and confront
its conscious and subconscious tendencies to stop, cite, or arrest lower
income African-American residents. Indeed, the Report cited that
Ferguson officers are fifty percent more likely to stop, and subsequently
arrest, when using their own judgment-a statistic significantly worse than
when officers use a radar gun to catch speeding drivers. 152
Countywide, Ferguson is not alone in its pattern of misuse of
discretion. The DOJ found that the entire St. Louis region operates on a
"wanted" notices system.' 53 The system essentially involves issuances of
"wanted" notices from one officer or department to another that ask
whoever encounters the "wanted" individual first to arrest him. 154 Wanted
notices neglect a big constitutional problem-officers usually need a
warrant before they can just arrest someone. 55 And, as the DOJ report
finds, these "wanted" notices are often "used as an end-run around the
judicial system."' 156
In the Decree, the DOJ called for repeal or revise to the Ferguson
Municipal Code, specifically for the Failure to Comply offense and the
vague jaywalking offense. 57  It also requested elimination of "wanted"
notices, beginning with a one-year moratorium. 158 In terms of supervision,
149. Chanin, supra note 98, at 40.
150. Id.
151. See supra Part II.A. Abuse of police discretion was exhibited in Alamance County,
where Sheriff Johnson allegedly encouraged deputies to ticket and arrest only Mexicans for minor
infractions. Despite DOJ findings, Sheriff Johnson continues to deny allegations of racism within
his office and has made no changes in supervising his staff.
152. Nora Kelly & Brian Resnick, In Ferguson, Racial Bias Makes Police Officers Worse
Than Machines, NAT'L J. (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/in-
fcrguson-speed-detectors-are-less-racially-biased-than-policc-officcrs-20150304.
153. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
154. Id.
155. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-24 (1976); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 111 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
156. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
157. Ferguson Draft Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 9-10.
158. Id. at 23-24. "During this moratorium, the City will continue to use 'be on the lookout'
or 'allpoints' bulletins, and warrants, consistent with generally accepted police practice
nationwide, and evaluate alternatives to the use of 'stop orders' or 'wanteds."' Id. at 24.
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the Decree asked the FPD to develop an extensive protocol for reviewing
arrests, issued citations, and warrants. 159 Each of these requested reforms
will aid the FPD is reassessing the meaning of discretion.
2. Implementing Body Cameras: Legal Body Armor or Shaky Instant
Replay?
Following the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson and the Eric
Garner deadly chokehold in Staten Island weeks later, the power of video
cameras resurfaced. As one of the measures taken in response to these fatal
police-citizen interactions, President Obama announced that the federal
government would spend upwards of $75 million on body cameras for law
enforcement officers nationwide.
60
Police leaders who have deployed body cameras welcome the
initiative, citing the many benefits associated with the devices. Body
cameras are useful for documenting evidence, officer training, reducing and
resolving complaints, and strengthening police accountability. In addition,
now that police protect and serve in a world where anyone with a cell
phone camera can record a police encounter, body cameras serve as legal
body armor. 161  They help police departments ensure events are also
captured from an officer's point of view. 1
62
As political leaders and most community members promote the
institution of body cameras for police officers nationwide, there is no
shortage of skeptics. John Burris, a prominent Civil Rights attorney, 
63
vocalized support for the use of lapel cameras in police departments but
nevertheless questions the real value they will provide. While the cameras
are a step in the right direction, "much of what happens in this country in
terms of police brutality doesn't happen on camera," Burris said. 164 The
159. Id. at 24-26. This includes field supervisors reviewing each arrest report and
memorializing their review in writing "by the end of the shift within which the arrest occurs." Id.
at 24. Supervisors will also review each request for a search or arrest warrant. They must assess
warrant applications and arrest reports for: "accuracy and authenticity; 'canned,' boilerplate, or
conclusory language, inconsistent information; inadequate articulation of legal basis for the police
action taken." Id. at 25.
160. Trymaine Lee, Zachary Roth & Jane C. Timm, Obama to Announce $75 Million for
Body Cameras, MSNBC (Dec. 1, 2014, 8:13 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-
announce-75-million-body-cameras.
161. DOJ: COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES ("COPS"), IMPLEMENTING A BODY-
WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014).
162. Id. at I.
163. Policing on Trial: Community, Race, Protest, and Reform (Mar. 19, 2015), UC Hastings
(speaking at the conference regarding civil rights and his work on the Oscar Grant case in
Oakland).
164. Id.
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function of the angle, the time of day, and the potentially shaky playback
that may result from a filmed altercation all test the effectiveness of body
cameras. Think of the number of sports replays, captured from several
camera angles and with slow motion, that are still controversial.
Sometimes, even a frame-by-frame playback leaves an interaction disputed.
Still, body cameras allow for some modicum of insight into the actual
officer-citizen interaction.
The Police Foundation recently completed a yearlong study on the
effectiveness of body cameras. 65 "The findings suggest more than a 50%
reduction in the total number of incidents of use-of-force compared to
control-conditions, and nearly ten times [reduction in] citizens'
complaints."' 166  Despite the impressive numbers and benefits of body
camera implementation, each police department is different. 167
The current Decree seeks that the FPD equip officers with body-worn
and in-car cameras to "promote transparency, provide learning
opportunities for officers, and increase officer safety."' 168 Ultimately, body
cameras should provide more pluses than minuses and facilitate sustainable
reform in Ferguson. At least on the surface, the devices will hold FPD
officers accountable and serve as legal body armor when officers are
unjustly accused of unconstitutional practices in the field. Body cameras
may not be a perfect third eye, but they are still another eye-objective and
more reliable than most eyewitness accounts of police-citizen interactions.
3. Making Room for Reform-Minded Leadership
Changes in leadership that coincide with federal intervention open the
door for a reform-minded prerogative to step in. One of the most positive
indications in Ferguson is the almost instantaneous change in leadership
that occurred after the Report was released. Three city officials resigned
within a week. 169 Now, whoever takes over as permanent FPD police chief
"will need to have the same leadership traits valued in boardrooms across
165. See generally Tony Farrar & Barak Ariel, Self-Awareness to Being Watched and
Socially-Desirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Police
Use-of-Force, THE POLICE FOUNDATION (2013) (finding that police body cameras were
associated with dramatic reductions in use-of-force and complaints against officers).
166. Id. at 9.
167. The SPD, for example, has not implemented body-worn cameras because it is waiting
on revisions to public disclosure state laws. Telephone interview with Brcndan Kolding,
Detective Sergeant, SPD (Feb. 19, 2016).
168. Ferguson Draft Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 52-53.
169. City Manager John Shaw, Municipal Judge Ronald Brockmeyer, and Police Chief
Thomas Jackson all resigned. Ben Kesling, Ferguson Police Chief Thomas Jackson Resigns,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2015, 7:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ferguson-police-chief-
thomas-jackson-resigns-1426106502.
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the world-the ability to form partnerships across organizational lines, to
think differently, to turn failure into success and to do it all in a harsh
media spotlight."'1
70
Indeed, Joshua Chanin's prominent study on the implementation of
pattern-or-practice reform theorizes that leaders "who are vocally
committed to the implementation process and skilled in developing and
communicating organizational agendas and priorities are particularly
valuable."' 71 Successful reform initiatives are projected from the police
chief down, but sometimes even the most reform-minded, persuasive police
chief cannot convince a command staff that federal intervention will help,
not hinder, officer morale. As Ferguson awaits appointment of its next
permanent police chief, the process could stall initial changes already being
executed within the FPD, including requiring supervisory approval for
issuing more than one citation during a single incident and demanding
officers participate in bias-free training.1
72
But a longer wait might be better than endless appointments,
removals, and resignations of various police chiefs over the span § 14141
reform. For example, ongoing reform in Detroit remains stop-and-go
mostly due to the city's inconsistent leadership. 173 Since its consent decree
was signed in 2003, Detroit has seen seven police chiefs, many of whom
were sidelined by personal and professional indecency. 74 While taking an
extended period of time to select a new, reform-minded police chief will
likely cause unrest and diminished morale in the FPD, interim instability is
better than premature selection of the most important leader in the reform
process.
The unconstitutional pattern or practice in Ferguson infiltrated more
than street-level policing; it tainted the entire investigative and adjudicatory
processes of a small town looking to dig its way out of debt at the expense
of its poorest residents. For this reason, there are two issues the police
chief in Ferguson will face: (1) a lack of trust on the community's part; and
170. Michael Pearson, The Tough Task Ahead for Ferguson's Next Police Chief, CNN (Mar.
13, 2015, 8:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/13/us/ferguson-next-police-chicf/. As of
March 2016, Andre Anderson remains the interim police chief. Jason Hanna, Ferguson Hires
Black Interim Police Chief, CNN (July 22, 2015, 2:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/22/us/
ferguson-missouri-police-chief/. Anderson was hired by a new reform-minded City Manager. As
Ferguson's first African-American head of police, albeit temporarily, he "says his main task will
be to restore trust." Id.
171. Chanin, supra note 98, at 40.
172. Letter from Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division to City Manager John Shaw and
Police Chief Thomas Jackson 2 (Mar. 3, 2015) (on file with author).
173. Weichselbaum, supra note 5.
174. Chanin, supra note 98, at 45.
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(2) a lack of confidence in leadership on the department's part. First,
rebuilding trust within the Ferguson community will be an arduous feat for
the future police chief. With the released DOJ findings, community
members have every reason to question officer motivations. This is
especially so because former Police Chief Jackson was at the center of
efforts to maximize the high fine schedule and pressured officers to write
citations to increase and fund the city budget. Breaking the negative
association the community has with the FPD, as an organization, will take
time, outreach, and a leader who sees the importance of merging federal
and local, state power.
Second, motivating the rank-and-file officers in the FPD will be
another significant hurdle. Officers in Ferguson know their actions,
whether deemed excessive or not, can set off social unrest and no one
wants to be the next Darren Wilson.' 75 Officer morale can take a big hit if
they sense a lack of support from local leadership, which includes both the
mayor and police chief. Take the turmoil in New York City for example.
Following the Eric Garner grand jury decision, Mayor Bill de Blasio
criticized the NYPD, sparking rebellion, work stoppages, and aggression
toward the mayor. 176 At funerals for slain officers, killed by a criminal
motivated by the Michael Brown and Eric Garner deaths, NYPD officers
turned their backs on the mayor and his leadership. 177 Ferguson leaders can
learn from the lack of communication and division in New York and ensure
local FPD officers find partnership in their municipal leaders.
Scholars argue that "the fact of federal oversight itself. . . can erode
morale in a police department, sapping the confidence and spirit that
effective policing requires.",178 Re-motivating FPD officers is a matter of
setting a tone and laying down the new rules. Many of these officers are
impressionable and, depending on who is in charge, will follow suit. "The
majority [of police officers] are going to be like soldiers in the Army. And
if the general says you treat people with respect and follow the
Constitution, that's what you're going to do." 179 While seemingly naive,
175. Phillip Swarts, Police Morale Takes Hit from Events Like Ferguson, Staten Island,
Officers Say, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/
22/police-morale-takes-hit-events-ferguson-staten-isl/.
176. Jack Linshi, Mayor Bill de Blasio Under Scrutiny After 2 NYPD Officers Killed, TIME
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://time.com/3643191/nypd-de-blasio/.
177. Justin Worland, Police Turn Their Backs on Mayor During Second NYPD Officer
Funeral, TIME (Jan. 4, 2015), http://time.com/3652979/dcblasio-nypd-funeral/.
178. STONEET AL.,supranote lO, at6.
179. Leon Neyfakh, Ferguson Is Hiring, SLATE (Mar. 20, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/crimc/2015/03/ferguson police chief tom jackson has res
igned how will the cityreplace.html.
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this perspective highlights the fact that the entire department in Ferguson,
from brass to rank-and-file, must be on the same reform-minded page. For
now, however, this aspect of the reform movement remains to be
determined. If Ferguson chooses a reform-minded police chief, preferably
from outside the current organization, 180 who can inspire change and
establish guidelines for implementing the consent decree, change will
follow.
4. Seeing Both Sides and Community Building
The principal provision of the Ferguson Decree is community policing
and engagement. 18 1 There are many easy adjustments the FPD can make
on this front, from implementing community citizen boards to making an
effort to engage with the African-American community. Once a line of
communication between police and community members is instituted, both
sides contributing to the social unrest may realize they are not as different
as they claim to be. The outpour of selected sentiments-"Black Lives
Matter" from police critics versus "Blue Lives Matter" from police
defenders-only strengthens a divide amongst individuals who share
common public and personal safety concerns.
In October 2015, the city established a citizen review board to make
recommendations to the Ferguson mayor, James Knowles III, and serve as
a public check on police conduct. 182 An effective, integrated citizen review
board is the initial step to community building. This is especially crucial
because the Report offers substantial evidence that Ferguson officials are
targeting African-American residents, in addition to evidence that some
city officials and officers are blatantly racist.1 83  If Ferguson is able to
utilize these citizen review boards and communicate effectively with the
FPD, the department will begin to learn more about the people they are
policing. Specifically, "there are entire segments of the Ferguson
community that [police] have never made an effort to know, especially
180. Ferguson may consider keeping Andre Anderson as the permanent police chief, as he
has established the importance of enhancing "the city's recent efforts to get officers to develop
positive relationships with people in the areas they patrol." Hanna, supra note 170. Anderson
also worked in Glendale, Arizona, where bias policing is also a forefront issue. Id
181. Ferguson Draft Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 4.
182. Moving Ferguson Forward, CITY OF FERGUSON OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://www.ferg
usoncity.com/531/Moving-Ferguson-Forward (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
183. FERGUSON REPORT supra note 2, at 12. But not all FPD officers agree with or abide by
the racist, revenue-centered policing within the department. One FPD officer questioned, "How
can you get blood from a turnip" in criticizing the department's scheme of mounting penalties on
people who cannot afford them. Id.
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African Americans who live in Ferguson's large apartment complexes.'
' 84
Most of these segments are low-income communities, contributing to the
twenty-five percent of the Ferguson's 21,000 residents qualifying as below
the federal poverty line.'
85
As FPD officers welcome community oversight and relationship
building with low-income residents, community members will need to have
a change in attitude as well. Public shaming of FPD officers is not the
long-term answer either. "[Police officers] don't go out every day saying,
'I'm going to take a life today.' They go out saying, 'I want to come
home.' They want to come home to their families."18 6 This feeling is no
different from the mother who fears her son will not make it home because
a "bad cop" will be in "the mood for excessive force."
The DOJ recommended giving FPD officers consistent geographical
beats so they can get to know a neighborhood. It also suggested that the
city think outside the box to create "opportunities for officers to have
frequent, positive interactions with people outside of an enforcement
context, especially groups that have expressed high levels of distrust of
police."
' 187
C. Introducing and Sustaining Reform in Ferguson
Reform in Ferguson is viable, despite the shortcomings that may
somewhat stall the process. The pattern-or-practice investigation of the
FPD revealed unconstitutional policing and racial bias, but the cash-
strapped city of Ferguson may choose to fight reform. While Ferguson
may technically embody the workings of an issue organization, the
prevalent fear across police and community lines, lack of leadership, and
abuse of discretion due to the FPD's culture, will instigate progress.
Additionally, the § 14141 investigation uncovered novel aspects that may
require reform backup plans in the event that the FPD takes on a more
resistant approach-either due to poor leadership or insurmountable costs
of reform.
184. Id. at 88.
185. See QuickFacts: Ferguson City, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2923986 (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
186. Eric Sandy, 'Sea of Blue' Rally Planned for Saturday in Support of Police, CLEVELAND
SCENE (Dec. 26, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archivcs/2014/12/26/
sea-of-bluc-rally-planned-for-saturday-in-support-of-policc.
187. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 90. The Decree, as currently drafted, states the
City of Ferguson will continue the Ferguson Youth Advisory Board, established in 2011, and the
Apartment Neighborhood Group. Ferguson Draft Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 7. These
associations are at the forefront of providing community engagement within the FPD.
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The Report unveiled, for the first time in a DOJ pattern-or-practice
investigation, unconstitutional and biased practices of a city's municipal
courts. For this reason, the Ferguson investigation was even broader than
expected, meaning structural reform will require supplemental procedures.
No other consent decree has incorporated changes within a city's court
system. 88 Because these unique circumstances provide for organizational
deficiencies in both the FPD and Ferguson's local judiciary, the DOJ
should incorporate both backup plans proposed in this Note to secure
reform sustainability.
First, in revising its consent decree with Ferguson, the DOJ should
include a follow-up clause that would allow for federal oversight to
reappear if the FPD is unable to maintain reforms once the external monitor
leaves. This security blanket will enlighten city officials and officers that
federalization of the FPD will not end until change is sustained.
Second, Ferguson has the ideal profile for implementation of an
auditing system that tracks the execution of reform recommendations
adopted by a department. An auditing, or internal monitoring system,
allows a department to scrutinize and test its own internal controls over
specific police officers actions. Concerned with revenue generation,
Ferguson monitored and motivated police officers and court officials to
reach various fine and fee quotas. While a form of auditing was present in
Ferguson, the motivation was utterly misplaced. Now, it is just a matter of
transforming the intent behind Ferguson's self-monitoring process.
Replacing a quota-driven mentality with incentives for resolving conflicts
without excessive force or unconstitutional arrests would redirect
Ferguson's focus to public safety and officer morale. A small department
like the FPD can excel with an auditing division given that there is less
material to cover and more one-on-one attention for particularly
problematic officers. It is likely that with an auditing system, similar to
that within the LAPD, progress would follow. This is so long as
supervisors review results from internal audits and subsequently reward,
commend, or promote complying and community-driven police officers.
V. Constitutional Objections to Strong Use of § 14141
Given the time-consuming nature of reforms and the steep costs of
implementing § 1414 1, many pushback or issue organizations challenge the
validity of DOJ intervention, citing constitutional concepts such as judicial
federalism. Historically, the Supreme Court maintained that a federal
188. Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#police (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
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judge should not supervise local police departments. In the 1970s and
1980s, three important Supreme Court cases laid barriers to federal
involvement in local policing: O'Shea v. Littleton, Rizzo v. Goode, and
most importantly City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.' 89  All of these cases
contained a powerful argument-still echoed by police departments
resisting reform today-against all-encompassing DOJ supervision1 90 of
local police departments, even in the face of race discrimination.
For instance, in Lyons, the plaintiff sued the LAPD after a dangerous
chokehold rendered him unconscious and injured. 191 He sought damages
and injunctive relief against the police department, barring the use of
chokeholds as a law enforcement tactic.' 92 The Court gracefully punted on
the issue. The "recognition of the need for a proper balance between state
and federal authority counsels [the Court's] restraint in the issuance of
injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the
states' criminal laws in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great
and immediate."' 93 Citing O'Shea and Rizzo, the Court held that federal
courts were without jurisdiction to entertain claims for injunctive relief
against local police departments engaging in unconstitutional practices.'
94
However, as the findings and documentations of police brutality
increased, so did civil rights legislation, which allowed the federal
government to intervene where state and local power faltered. Pursuant to
its Section 5 remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
may act to prevent potential constitutional violations.' 95 That is, Congress
has the power "'to enforce' by 'appropriate legislation' the constitutional
guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of 'life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law' nor deny any person 'equal
protection of the laws.'"196 Congress used this remedial power when it
enacted legislation like § 14141, filling the gap for needed federal DOJ
reform of local police departments.
It is well supported that Congress has broad remedial powers where
actual constitutional violations have been documented. 197 Unlike Lyons
189. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
190. These cases deal with federal judicial intervention rather than federal executive
intervention-but they raise a theme that in an important way cuts across federal branches.
191. Id. at 95, 97-98.
192. Id. at 95.
193. ld. at 112.
194. ld. at 95.
195. Evan Tsen Lee, The Trouble with City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for the Fifteenth
Amendment as Well, 90 DENY. U. L. REV. 483 (2012).
196. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
197. See id. at 507.
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and its predecessor cases, when enacting § 14141 and other civil rights
legislation that empowered DOJ intervention, Congress discovered and
maintained actual evidence of race discrimination in local law police
departments. Such clear congressional fact-finding was absent in earlier
lawsuits like Lyons. While some may argue DOJ reform strains against the
boundaries of federalism, Congress was at the peak of its remedial powers
when it enacted § 14141. That amount of remedial power, paired with the
blatant acts of racism that have infiltrated some police departments,
outweighs arguments advocating for judicial federalism or local control of
law enforcement.
Conclusion
Pattern-or-practice investigations provide a roadmap for fixing
unconstitutional police practices, and if implemented selectively and
enforced persistently, will institute incremental change. Reforming the
FPD may take nearly a decade. It will be a movement that incorporates
revamped training, citizen review boards, body and dashboard cameras,
and improvements in community-police relations through mutual
understanding. Because Ferguson is a high-stakes organization with deep-
rooted discrimination and deficiencies, follow-up procedures will ensure
sustainable reform. But, until all these conditions are met, the FPD and the
community will remain in danger.
Federal intervention under § 14141 will pressure the FPD to rebuild
not only its organizational infrastructure, but also trust within the
community, save a series of potential shortcomings. Ferguson's size,
finances, and lack of communication between police officers and residents
weigh against positive impact of structural reform litigation-at least
initially. This heavy weight, however, can be counterbalanced with
effective backup plans for institutionalizing reform post federal monitoring.
Still, the question of power remains: does pattern-or-practice reform
go too far in federalizing the police? Yes, criminal justice is typically
viewed as a "local issue," but federal intervention is sometimes the only
ball left in the air. The situation in Ferguson epitomizes this. When Officer
Darren Wilson was found innocent of any legal wrongdoing in the Michael
Brown shooting, a § 14141 top-down investigation of the FPD was the last
push to change a detrimental police culture. Forcing local departments to
own up to unconstitutional policing sets an example, threatens exposure,
and allocates resources to desperate law enforcement agencies. Where, as
the case was here, local government does not have the resources or the
resolve to ensure a fair proceeding or the implementation of sustainable
reform, a stronger, sharper, federal tool is needed. That need grows even
[Vol. 43:4
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stronger where a community lacks trust in its local officials to conduct a
complete investigation. With problems of bias, inadequate resources, and
community distrust affecting departments across the country, § 14141 is the
only federal tool strong enough to combat these challenges head on. In
turn, the DOJ can effect great change and ensure long-term, sustainable
improvement of police practices for the betterment of all parties
involved. 19o
198. Rushin, supra note 34, at 1347-48 (reporting that and despite only sixty-five
interventions of over 18,000 agencies, where implemented, these reforms have impact with
"nearly one in five Americans is served by a law enforcement agency that has been subject to a
[DOJ] investigation via § 14141").
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